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Discussion in 'Personal' started by artboyusa, Oct 30, 2015.
Ah Russian ground troops and airforces, mixed with Iranian ground forces, mixed with NATO air missions and US special forces...
Can't see anything going wrong here.
World War Three... brought to you by.... SYRIA!
Looks like it's just you and me Art!
Ah, I wouldn't be surprised if US Special Forces have already been active in the area.
Edit: Only posted this to stop the thread dropping off page 1.
Ask me about my solution to the Syrian crisis!
What is your solution to the Syrian crisis Eureka?
Is it stepper modules?
I thought you'd never ask!
The solution is to make sure Russia has a naval base in the med.
But it already has a naval base in the Med...
Oh wait, do you mean a new base in a different place?
make SURE they have a naval base, regardless of who takes over in Syria.
I bet it involves lots of armchair soldiers.
Lots of them? What a poorly constructed jibe!
I very much doubt if a certain base near Hereford is full of rough tough men twiddling their thumbs, sitting drumming their fingers on the NAAFI tables and watching Jeremy Kyle because there's nothing else to do.
I'm not 100% sure that Russia's concerns solely revolve around possession of a naval base.
Obviously it is a factor...
William McCants outlined some of the strategic options for dealing with ISIS in an earlier article:
'Some of the usual methods for dealing with jihadist statelets might have worked early on in Syria and Iraq. But the Islamic State is too entrenched now for quick solutions. Defeating its government is going to take time. Disrupting the Islamic State’s finances will be difficult because the group does not rely much on outside funding. Attacking from the air will degrade the Islamic State but will not destroy it. Its soldiers are in urban areas where they are hard to target without killing thousands of civilians.
Some methods will help only at the margins. Stanching the flow of foreign fighters is very difficult, given Syria’s porous borders and the excitement the Islamic State generates among Muslim radicals. Reducing the mass appeal of the State is pointless, given that it doesn’t have mass appeal and isn’t trying to cultivate it. What little appeal the Islamic State has rests on its ability to endure and expand. Take away either of those and you erode its legitimacy. In this case, the ideological fight is an actual fight.
Some methods work well but have a lot of downsides. Arming the Sunni tribes against the Islamic State doesn’t guarantee they’ll fight against it. They don’t trust the Shi’i governments in Damascus and Baghdad and could just as easily decide to support the Islamic State or sit out the fight.
Arming Arab Sunni rebel groups to fight the Islamic State is no guarantee they’ll get the job done either. They’re focused on fighting their respective governments in Syria and Iraq and reluctant to tangle with a powerful rival. Furthermore, a number of those groups are religiously extreme and won’t contribute to building a pluralistic future in either country.
Arming the Kurds is attractive because they’re more pluralistic, but they won’t be able to do much against the Islamic State in its Sunni Arab stronghold. The Kurds are an ethnic minority in Syria and Iraq, and they won’t take and hold Arab territory far from their homeland. Plus, the Kurds might use the weapons to fight for their own independence, which would create further instability.
Building the capacity of the governments in Iraq and Syria to deal with the Islamic State is also fraught with problems. Bolstering the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad might further reinforce the country’s sectarian politics that alienated its Sunnis in the first place. It’s an even more dangerous policy in Syria because of its leader, who has let the Islamic State flourish to make his bloody methods appear less repugnant and to destroy his opposition from the inside.
The last option, sending in a large contingent of American troops, would enflame public opinion at home and abroad, ensuring that the United States will not be able to see its mission through. It would also absolve local governments of making the tough political choices required to end the Sunni disenfranchisement that fuels the insurgency.
Until the Shi’i governments in Syria and Iraq reach an accommodation with their Sunni citizens, the international coalition against the Islamic State can only constrain its growth. The coalition should continue using air power to diminish the State’s ability to raise money and wage war. It shouldn’t work with President Assad in Syria because he has deliberately fueled the rise of the Islamic State and probably won’t stop. The government in Baghdad hasn’t deliberately helped the State come to power, but its anti-Sunni policies have contributed to the State’s success. So the coalition should give the government in Baghdad all the intelligence and logistical support it needs to fight against the Islamic State, but it should be wary of supplying more heavy weapons than are necessary to prosecute the war. The weapons could end up in the State’s hands, as happened when Iraq’s soldiers fled Mosul; but perhaps more important, giving the government whatever it wants discourages it from making the hard political compromises with the Sunnis that will sap the Islamic State’s base of support.
The international coalition can also support proxies to fight against the Islamic State, but the support must be carefully calibrated so as to avoid creating more long-term political problems. The coalition should provide air cover and intelligence to Sunni tribal militias and rebel groups that fight against the Islamic State, whether Arab or Kurd. If it looks like the groups are in the fight for the long haul, then the coalition should consider arming them with light weaponry if they need it. Working with the Shi’i militias against the Islamic State is unnecessary, given that they already have a powerful state sponsor in Tehran.
If you think all of that sounds a lot like the coalition’s current military strategy, you’re right. It’s not a great plan, but it’s the best option at the moment.'
The full article can be found here:
His recently published book The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State is excellent. McCants is proficient in Islamic theology and history, modern jihadism, and Arabic, and his book includes translations of secret correspondence between al-Qaeda and Islamic state, as well as some of the ancient apocalyptic religious passages, mainly drawn from hadith collections, that inspire that aforementioned 'Doomsday Vision'.
I wonder what side we'll be on? Tough to tell, since I'm not sure we're even on our own side. I guess we'll find out when we lose again.
When you say 'we' who do you mean art?
The UK or USA? And if you ask which 'side' then which war are we meaning? After all the USA has been [and I think still is] pretty hot on removing Assad. And there is the anti-ISIS fight. So it is two wars. Or do you mean WWIII which I referred to earlier?
Because in WWII it took a while for the 'sides' to become clear.
Hard to know which side to be on.
Hard to know how many sides there are.
Following the stupid misadventures in Iraq, a hundred different angry little groups have been formed in the region and begun to spread their hatred, causing untold human suffering, movements of displaced people not seen since the end of WW2 and an intractable problem of who to align with.
And still it is seen as something of a game being played out somewhere else that we have no responsibility for causing and that still needs our benevolent guiding hand to help solve. Even though we have no real understanding of what's going on. Makes Afghanistan look like a roaring success.
Well of course it's a game Scintillant... these things have always been 'games' to the mandarins in Whitehall, the Kremlin or on Pennsylvania Avenue. The Great Game of the 19th century, Britain and Russia vying for control of Central Asia. The Scramble for Africa, European powers tearing at Africa for a slice of the pie. [I know you know these things, just rambling]
The lives of the people on the ground matter not a jot. It's a sort of psychopathy... a blissful ignorance of the impact of your actions but on national scales, whether it be Moscow, Paris, Beijing, Washington, Tehran or London.